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Abstract: There has been a policy shift towards localism in the UK driving responses and
decision-making processes to respond to the impacts of climate change. This shift capitalizes on local
expertise and knowledge, empowering communities to take ownership of response strategies, with an
increased focus on building resilience to nexus shocks. This comes at a time when the ability of
local authorities to lead responses to nexus shocks is decreasing due to lack of capacity, funding and
a statutory requirement to better respond to the impacts of climate change. We examine local
resilience to nexus shocks and climate impacts as a complex process of collaboration, communication,
adaptation, learning from past events and preparing for future shocks. Drawing on examples of
resilience to extreme weather events in the UK, this review paper assesses: (1) local responses to
nexus shocks in the UK; (2) how and what evidence is used to inform decision-making in response to
nexus shocks; and (3) how stakeholders increase local resilience to nexus shocks when faced with
gaps in knowledge. We outline possible ways to extrapolate these insights beyond the UK context.
Keywords: climate change; nexus shocks; resilience; local decision-making; communication;
collaboration
1. Introduction
1.1. Context
The meanings, applications and implications of the concept of ‘nexus thinking’ in the
United Kingdom (UK) natural resource debates are generally found to vary, whilst the evidence
base continues to grow rapidly [1–3]. Climate- and weather-related shocks, defined as “low probability,
low frequency high impact events” [4], impact the food, energy, water and environment (FEWE) nexus
and occur in the UK particularly in the form of flooding and heatwaves. A range of shocks are ranked
by the UK Climate Change Risk Assessment (UK CCRA) [5], the London Resilience Risk Register [6]
and the UK National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies [7] in the top areas of inter-related climate
change risks faced by the UK, requiring more action, research, novel approaches and new strategic
partnerships [8]. Flooding and heatwaves in particular are listed as key risks to the UK.
Responses to climate change in the UK are primarily led by a number of government departments:
the Department for the Environment, Farming and Rural Affairs (Defra) with the Environment Agency
and Natural England lead on adaptation; the Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) led
on mitigation until merging with the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) to become
the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) in 2016; and the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Department for International Development (DfID) are responsible
for international action on climate change and responses to impacts abroad. In addition, the UK
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Cabinet Office houses the Cabinet Office Briefing Room A (COBRA) committee along with the Civil
Contingencies Secretariat and helped set up the National Hazards Partnership in 2011 to provide
evidence on natural hazard risk management for civil contingencies, governments and responder
communities across the UK.
1.2. Review Approach
Building on findings from a UK project which explores how to better inform decision-making
in response to nexus shocks [9], this review paper explores the roles and perspectives of local
decision-makers, processes and communication strategies in response to nexus shocks and how
these shocks affect the local level. The potential scope of this review paper and the evidence base
it could draw upon are broad, deep and evolving, and therefore the research presented here is not
intended to be exhaustive but rather a snapshot with signposts to further required research.
In order to identify relevant literature to include in the assessment of evidence which forms the
basis of this review, a systematic approach was employed to ensure that the review of evidence draws
on a comprehensive and unbiased evidence base that is relevant to the overall focus of the paper.
The initial inclusion and exclusion criteria for evidence were defined in alignment with the focus of
the paper and through discussions with key experts and authors in the field, identified through an
initial literature search (Table 1).
Table 1. Inclusion criteria for the literature search.
Inclusion Criteria
Include grey literature, articles, reviews or conference papers
Include papers published between 2003 and 2016 to capture evidence for the 2003 heatwave.
Include only studies about and examples of nexus OR nexus shock OR food OR energy OR water OR
environment AND climate change AND decision making.
Include studies carried out in England OR Northern Ireland OR Wales OR Scotland OR Britain OR UK OR
the United Kingdom.
The review focuses on climate and severe weather shocks to the food, energy, water and
environment nexus and on the risks of flooding, high temperatures and food production and trade.
In order to establish the range, balance and overall weight of evidence, a number of different data
sources (practitioner, policy and academic) were examined in order to identify and extract the
overarching themes of relevance to each section of this review paper. Through a first manual screening
of the titles and abstracts, papers were excluded where it was clear that their focus was not relevant
to the review. The remaining papers were then classified by their broad framing, such as their focus
on a particular area of the nexus or nexus shock, level of decision-making, or resilience. Full papers
were then read, cross-checked with the inclusion and exclusion criteria and a final list produced.
Thorough processes, including regular moderation, were established to ensure that the project team
took a consistent approach to applying inclusion and exclusion criteria and reviewing papers.
Based on the above approach, we structure the paper in the following way: Section 2 provides an
assessment of definitions of nexus thinking and nexus shocks, Section 3 explores the local relevance of
nexus shocks with particular emphasis on heatwaves and flooding, Section 4 discusses responses and
resilience to these shocks locally, and Section 5 concludes with a call for more research on specific areas
that would further increase the evidence base on decision-making with respect to local nexus shocks.
2. Defining Nexus Thinking and Nexus Shocks
A large body of work explores a variety of aspects of the nexus, “all [of which] seek to describe
interactions across and between relevant systems” [10] (p. 1). There is consensus that the ‘nexus’ of
water, energy, food and environment systems has gained prominence internationally, particularly in
science and environmental policy, governance and business spheres and across academic research
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disciplines [1–3,9–17]. The food-energy-water-environment (FEWE) nexus is also referred to as the
‘water-energy-food nexus’ (WEF), ‘water-energy-food-climate nexus’ or ‘energy-food-environment
nexus’ and as to the origins of nexus terminology, consensus is less strong. The term ‘nexus’ has been
used to describe interactions between the food-energy-water-environment systems since the 1980s [1]
(Box 1).
Box 1. Emergence of the concept of ‘nexus shocks’ at the international level.
The term ‘nexus shocks’ featured at the 2008 and 2011 World Economic Forums and in 2009 former Chief
Scientific Advisor to the UK Government Sir John Beddington made reference to the ‘Perfect Storm’
. . . of interlinked challenges facing humanity and a number of prominent international institutions
(such as the World Bank, the UN World Water Assessment Programme, the European Commission,
the OECD and the Global Water Partnership) subsequently produced policy and perspective papers
on the nexus [13]. According to much of this literature, the solution to the interlinked challenges
outlined by Beddington, was [‘nexus thinking’ or a ‘nexus perspective’]. [3] (p. 164)
Nexus thinking was a main focus of the Bonn 2011 Conference, the 6th World Water Forum in Marseilles in 2012,
the Rio +20 negotiations 2012, and the 2014 Stockholm Water Week.
The nexus is a useful concept to frame the complexities of resources, sectors, stakeholders and
methods of thinking and working (Box 2). It represents “. . . a multi-dimensional means of scientific
enquiry which seeks to describe the complex and non-linear interactions between water, energy, food,
with the climate, and further understand wider implications for society with interdependencies and
tensions across sectors” [1–3,11,13,14].
Box 2. Why ‘nexus’ is a useful concept [4].
The nexus concept:
• Provides a lens through which we can gain a deeper understanding of how these resources are linked,
how changes in one can affect another, and it highlights how complex the processes are that connect them.
• Provides a way to capture the interactions and interdependencies between the elements that define it as
well as how stakeholders involved in nexus issues interact with each other.
• Enables a better understanding of (un)intended consequences of policies, technologies and practices that
may arise around nexus issues whilst simultaneously shining light on areas of opportunity that may
merit investigation.
• Provides a natural frame for rethinking sustainability as a way of analysing problems which can be
approached more effectively when considered as a whole.
• Represents a multi-dimensional means of scientific inquiry which seeks to describe the complex and
non-linear interactions between water, energy and food systems with the climate.
When considering the complexities of the nexus, we see that it has two dimensions related
to: (1) food-energy-water-environment resources; and (2) the trans-disciplinary approach linking
different actors, sectors and decisions that are made across these resources [9]. Whilst it captures
the trans-disciplinary nature of nexus resources, interactions, sectors, stakeholders and associated
decision-making processes, Cairns and Krzywoszynska [3] (p. 164) argue that the term is “a buzzword:
a term whose power derives from a combination of ambiguous meaning and strong normative
resonance”. The term is simultaneously used to refer to integrated ways of thinking however,
as discussed by Allouche et al. it may act to confuse the debate [13]:
The nexus is an immature concept in need of a more critical conceptualisation [and]
. . . although it is difficult to disagree with a vision of integration between water, food and
energy systems, there are fewer consensuses about what it means in reality. While some
consider its framing to be too restrictive (excluding climate change and nature), particular
actors see it as linked to green economy and poverty reduction, while others emphasise
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global scarcity and value chain management. The nexus debates, however, mask a bigger
debate on resource inequality and access, contributing to social instability [13] (p. 617).
The need to address these considerations has inspired additional lenses [13] to those proposed
by Howarth and Monasterolo [9] which would enable a more effective and holistic approach to
understanding nexus thinking: better consideration for the local context, decision-making across scales,
the role of science and technology, and the importance of understanding how plural ways of thinking
can inform decision-making processes.
Building on this, a ‘shock’ is defined as the “manifestation of risk” [18] (p. 4) and uninsured
shocks specifically are defined as “adverse events that lead to a loss of household income, a reduction
in consumption and/or a loss of productive assets” [19] (p. 1). In the system reliability modelling
world, the term ‘shock’ “is usually defined by the time between two consecutive shocks, the damage
caused by a shock, the system failure and the dependence relationship among the above elements” [20]
(p. 405). However, “there is no one agreed method for quantifying or categorizing when a country
has experienced a food production shock” and differences can be seen in the “levels, countries and
timings for shocks” [21] (p. 8) used by different studies. Ultimately, the key characteristics of a nexus
shock [9], which we adopt in this review paper, include: a low-probability, low-frequency, high-impact
event with multi-scale, multi-stakeholder and multi-resource impacts that span food, energy and water
systems. Due to the relatively recent development of ‘nexus’ terminology and frameworks as well as
context dependency, the lack of evidence specifically related to nexus shocks underlines the need for
further research.
Terms such as ‘climate’, ‘climate-related’, ‘severe weather’ or ‘extreme weather’ shocks, or a
prefix of a specific shock impact area such as on food, production, energy, price or supply and the
term ‘risks’ instead of ‘shocks’ tend to be more commonly used in academic, grey and practitioner
literature but have slightly different meanings and implications [22–29]. For example, the United
Nation’s Development Programme’s (UNDP) 2007 report Climate Shocks and their Impact on Assets [22]
employs the term ‘climate shocks’ and explores the relationship between shocks and risks:
Risks are prospects of a shock or, alternatively, shocks can be thought as the realization
of risks. [T]he term ‘shocks’ has already a very specific connotation that encompasses:
(i) unexpectedness (i.e., the risky damaging fluctuation already happened, though it had
low ex-ante probability); (ii) size; (iii) high damage due to concentration on persons with
high vulnerability and low resilience; (iv) exogenousness in the source; and (v) physical or
psychological strain to one or more individuals due to that stress. Thus, the term climate
shock would already cover what the disaster literature considers to be a natural disaster:
those events that outstrip the capacity of a society to cope with it [22] (p. 1).
This distinction is useful, providing endorsement for using the term nexus ‘shocks’ and the need
for building resilience and capacities of a society, system or structure to cope with and adapt to respond
better to a shock. It is a reminder of the continual need to avoid using terms as if they are self-evident
in their implications, to ask questions of why a term is being used returns to the argument that ‘nexus’
is another buzzword [3].
3. The Local Context and Responses to Nexus Shocks
The UK was the first country to have a Climate Change Act and a National Adaptation Programme
focused on addressing the consequences of climate change, suggesting a strong drive from central
government in response to nexus shocks. However, since 2010 and the UK Government’s launch of the
‘Big Society’ agenda, the local context has been characterised by a policy shift towards localism [30]
which has had two important impacts in relation to decision-making in response to nexus shocks in
the UK. Firstly, local authority (LA) requirements to report against national indicators ended, between
2008 and 2010 there were national performance indicators on carbon emissions reductions and climate
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change adaptation for LAs. Instead, much of what is in place now is reliant on voluntary actions [30,31].
Secondly, responsibility for action (including on climate change) has been devolved to the local level
with “the need to enhance risk ownership by communities” ([32], p. 1). The resulting implications
are that the agenda capitalizes on local expertise and knowledge with a focus on building community
resilience to nexus shocks. As stated by Howarth and Painter ([33], p. 10), “climate change is a
local and context-specific issue” and therefore much work in practice on responses to nexus shocks
occurs at the local level. Furthermore, with the withdrawal of the state and its funding from the local
level, combined with the projected increases in magnitude and frequency of nexus shocks due to
climate change in the UK, the need for effective local level responses, collaboration and communication
between tiers of society and government as well as research on this area is urgently required [34].
3.1. Nexus Shocks at the Local Level: A Focus on Flooding and Heatwaves
To build local resilience to nexus shocks, research points to the importance of confronting the
politics and power inside the concept of ‘resilience’. The Department for International Development’s
(DfID) 2011 Resilience Framework raises important questions to consider whenever resilience is being
used [31,32,35,36], such as resilience ‘to what’ (for example, to what kinds of threat? What types of
shock or stress?), resilience ‘of what’ (e.g., a structure of function; a community, an institutional
structure or infrastructure or the qualities of services being resilient), and resilience ‘for whom’
(i.e., those who are likely to benefit or those who may be excluded). Current UK Government
policy in relation to resilience and nexus shocks mainly centres on emergency planning and a
reactive decision-making process to build resilience to specific climate-related (e.g., floods) and
non-climate-related (e.g., industrial action, terrorist attacks) nexus shocks and on resilience of a wide
range of entities such as communities, institutions and structures in the short term [37]. Emergency
events are not necessarily assessed and responded to proactively or in the wider context of climate
change. There is therefore a need to move beyond a reactive decision-making process in order to adapt
and transform with respect to future nexus shocks, “understand the importance of local action for
global impacts” ([9], p. 59) and build long-term resilience.
In the UK, resilience has been the focus of a number of research activities, funding calls and
cross-research council initiatives [38–42]. Therefore, it is posited that where the terminology has filtered
down to the local level “it tends to provide only a framing, rather than being used to assess project
progress or success, or as a way to develop interventions” ([31], p. 64], perhaps as a means to adapt to
funders’ frameworks.
The UK is affected by a number of climate- and weather-related shocks, two of which have been
ranked as most important to the UK [25] and hence we explore these in more detail in the context
of local decision-making: flooding and heatwaves. We do so by exploring the following questions:
Firstly, what is the shock? Secondly, how does it affect at the local level? Thirdly, what are the local
responses to the shock (and evidence of this)? Finally, how could this be improved? Table 2 provides
an overview of the actors involved in decision making in response to the nexus shocks of flooding and
heatwaves at the local level and examples of the work they undertake.
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Table 2. Overview of the actors involved in decision making in response to the nexus shocks of flooding,
heatwaves and food price spikes at the local level.
Institution Sector Examples of Work on the Ground Flooding Heatwaves
Local authority
(LA) Public
• Community and business engagement
• Provide information, resources and guidance to raise awareness about
risks, mitigation and adaptation action
• Provide resilience infrastructure, e.g., property level protection, sandbag
stores, etc.
• Develop resilience strategies to be used by communities
• Identify opportunities and constraints of the planning process for
shock management
• Help communities/businesses develop resilience plans
• Work with partners to collect data to map flood risk and
vulnerable groups
4 4
National Flood
Forum (NFF)
Civil
society
• Trusted intermediary between LAs and communities
• Offer a resource hub, flood surgeries and guidance
• Facilitate and support community flood groups
• Help communities prepare for and recover from floods
4
Community
groups
(including flood
groups)
Civil
society
• Train flood wardens or other community champions
• Raise awareness of nexus shocks
• Communicate nexus shock warnings
• Support communities and businesses in developing emergency and
resilience plans
• Identify/support vulnerable community members/groups
4 4
Local Resilience
Forums (LRF) Public
• LRFs were formed as a requirement of the Civil Contingencies Act (2004),
comprising key emergency responders and specific supporting agencies.
• Facilitate multi-agency meetings and training
• Share information and lessons learned from exercises, emergencies and
emerging policies to facilitate planning and response to shocks
• Produce Community Risk Registers
4 4
Internal drainage
boards Private
• Manage and maintain water levels and flood defence
• Operate and maintain 30 onshore wind farms, 1 bio-energy power station,
over 500 pumping stations, 22,000 km of watercourse, 175 automatic
weed screen cleaners, etc.
4
Utilities Private
• Water and sewerage companies clear up spills from public sewers and
pumping stations, restore drinking water supplies
• Electricity companies restore infrastructure and supplies, supply
generators to customers and refuel
4 4
3.1.1. Flooding
The UK CCRA 2017 Evidence Report “presents compelling evidence that climate change may
lead to increases in heavy rainfall and significantly increased risks from fluvial and surface flooding
by mid-century” ([5], p. 11) making flooding the most prominent climate change adaptation issue
faced by communities in the UK [7,8,37,43–45]. If the current levels of adaptation continue, and
assuming a 2 ◦C global increase in temperatures, annual damages are expected to rise by 50% [44]
with related project costs of flooding reaching £10 billion in the next 25 years [37] leading to increased
risks of cascading infrastructure failures in terms of energy, transport, water and communication links.
Longer-term stresses across the nexus can also be generated, such as: negative impacts on food and
energy security (e.g., energy outages) and loss of, or pollution of, agricultural land and food crops
leading to rising costs of living including increases in home insurance premiums, energy bills and
food price spikes [46,47]. The Committee on Climate Change warns that the impacts of flooding and
coastal change shocks to communities, businesses and infrastructure “are already significant” with
“more action needed” ([8], p. 4); further evidenced by the severe floods experienced in Boscastle (2004),
Carlisle (2005), Hull (2007), Cumbria (2009) and the winter floods of 2013–2014 and 2015 in the UK [48].
Alongside these events there has been a shift in policy, attitude, roles and responsibilities
and a change in paradigm from one of flood resistance to resilience that now drive responses and
decision-making in flood risk management (FRM) in the UK [48]. Within this shift, “. . . stakeholder
engagement and public participation are seen as central to effective FRM” ([49], p. 275) and to
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developing more accurate and effective flood risk planning, solutions and responses at the local
level, such as community flood groups and flood plans; property level protection; mapping and
identifying need and vulnerability, and so forth [49]. This is further reflected in the UK government’s
national response plans to flooding events: Making Space for Water strategy [50], the Pitt Review [43],
the Water and Flood Risk Management Act, UK Climate Change Risk Assessment 2017: Projections
of Future Flood Risk [44], and the National Flood Resilience Review [45]. As a result, in 2016,
the Government established Flood Re to make affordable flood insurance available to households
in flood risk areas and the National Flood Resilience Review was published in response to the severe
floods of 2014–2015 ([45], p. 2). The review identifies “530 sites around the country where key local
infrastructure (e.g., clean water, electricity, health and telecoms) is still vulnerable to flooding” ([45],
p. 17), each potentially affecting at least 10,000 people. As part of the review, Government “secured
commitments from the water and telecommunications industries to make their infrastructure more
resilient” and, in collaboration with the Met Office, developed plausible extreme rainfall scenarios of
20–30% more than previously; evidence that Government now fully recognizes the impact of climate
change on increasing flood risk ([45], pp. 1–3) at the local level.
An example of a government-led initiative to build resilience to flood risk at the local level was
Defra’s £5 million Flood Resilience Community Pathfinder (FRCP) scheme (2013-15). Supporting 13
projects led by LAs in areas of significant or greater risk of flooding across England, the scheme
aimed to assess the factors that help to build resilience, support the implementation of physical
interventions (e.g., property level protection) and encourage new approaches to partnership working,
collaboration and communication, particularly between LAs and communities [31]. Key outcomes
across the FRCP projects included the establishment and maintenance of 111 community flood groups
as well as community flood forums and networks which add to the existing governance arrangements
for FRM at the local level ([51], p. 1). Setting these up through multi-agency partnerships involving
other LA departments, national agencies (e.g., Environment Agency), civil society and communities
proved invaluable to developing these institutional structures, governance processes and networks
which have been important for building institutional resilience and linking with the wider resilience
agenda [31,48].
3.1.2. Heatwaves
There is currently no universally accepted definition of a heatwave ([52], p. 15) with important
implications for communication, decision-making and shared understanding. The Met Office uses the
World Meteorological Organisation’s definition (WMO): “. . . when the daily maximum temperature
of more than five consecutive days exceeds the average maximum temperature by 5 degrees Celsius,
the normal period being 1961–1990” [53]. Heatwaves are currently rare in the UK, however the
frequency, intensity and length of heatwaves are predicted to be exacerbated by future climate and
demographic changes and increasing urban development [8,54–56]. However, “hot weather already
presents a risk to people and property”, particularly ‘urban heat risk’ in cities in the UK ([54], p. 1)
making this an important shock to explore.
Public Health England’s (PHE) publishes its UK Heatwave Plan annually since 2004 as a result
of the devastating heatwave experienced across Europe in August 2003. The shock of a severe and
prolonged heatwave such as this can negatively impact food, water and energy supplies as well as
businesses, transport, health and social care services with effects felt at the local level. Preston et al.
report the impact in England: “. . . where peak temperatures reached 38.5 ◦C, in the hottest period of
August 2003 there were 17% (2091) more deaths than expected, given the average for the same period in
the previous five years; a 42% increase in deaths was noted in London. . . .” ([47], p. 23). The UK CCRA
2017 predicts summer heatwaves like those experienced in 2003 to become the norm by the 2040s and
premature heat-related deaths to more than triple by the 2050s ([8], p. 4). PHE’s plan describes the
five-tiered (Levels 0–4) heat–health watch system which operates annually in England from 1 June to
15 September, supported by heatwave alerts co-produced with the Met Office. The decision to issue a
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Level 4 alert and to declare a national emergency “is made at national level and will be taken in light
of a cross-government assessment of the weather conditions, coordinated by the Civil Contingencies
Secretariat (Cabinet Office)” ([57], p. 33).
The factors that make people, systems and structures vulnerable to high temperatures are complex
and dynamic, and include quality of housing and the built environment, local urban geography,
household income, employment, tenure, social networks and self-perception of risk [58]. In a manner
similar to the risks of flooding and food price spikes, “These factors influence an individual’s exposure
and sensitivity to high temperatures, as well as their ability to anticipate, respond and adapt to
conditions to avoid heat stress” ([52], p. 8). Perhaps due to a lack of perceived immediacy or severity
of the shock that heat waves currently present, Lefevre et al. find that adults in the UK “perceive
heat protection methods as ineffective and unnecessary” ([55], p. 282). As such, “[a]lthough hot
weather poses potential health threats, many UK adults seek the outdoors during hot weather without
protecting themselves [or their property] against the heat” ([55], p. 282). Heat risks tend not to be
perceived as personal risks and “therefore planned preventive measures by individuals are largely
elusive. . . . Policy related to heat relies on early warning and public information programmes and does
not reduce underlying vulnerability” ([59], p. 2721). To address this issue, PHE and the Met Office
are collaborating with the National Health Service (NHS), AgeUK and Cancer Research campaigns
to communicate health advice to vulnerable groups. However, vulnerability can derive from limited
awareness of such advice and capacity to respond and this places a responsibility on actors at the local
level to monitor vulnerable community members [60].
In his work on the social impact of heatwaves, Benzie finds that “Community champions have
been shown to be particularly effective in building flood resilience and could be similarly successful in
building resilience to heatwaves” ([52], p. 74). This raises the question as to whether building resilience
to one nexus shock (such as flooding) requires the same capacities as others (such as heatwaves)
as proposed by Benzie, particularly due to the multidimensional nature of different nexus shocks
impacts and the distinctive knowledge needed and actions required. It may be taken as a given that a
community with strong social capital will be good at resilience building in response to any shock but
this is an area needing further testing and research.
Flooding and heatwaves are characterised by multiple meteorological, environmental and
geographic complexities and impact society and the energy-food-water-environment nexus in a
number of ways, both directly and indirectly. The overview we have provided here demonstrates the
potential severe impacts they can have, the resulting processes that have been put in place to respond
to them, and the range of stakeholders involved (see Table 2). These have often been the result of a
shock event (e.g., the 2013–2014 winter floods or the 2003 European heatwave) and have involved
leadership, communication, and collaboration across sectors, scales and stakeholders, with scientific
advice underpinning much of this process [33]. However, when these types of shocks occur, due to
their ‘shock-like’ nature, decision-making may not ‘follow the norms of rationality’ ([61], p. 14) and
information provided to inform that decision making may not necessarily meet the needs of those
using it [62]. The importance of communication and collaboration therefore merit deeper thought to
challenge the linear processes of information dissemination that are often in place (e.g., producing a
report or assessing evidence assumed to be sufficient to inform attitudes and decision making) and
adopt more co-production approaches to ensure decisions align with the needs of end users and those
most vulnerable to the impacts of these shocks.
4. Informing and Building Local Resilience to Nexus Shocks
4.1. Informing UK National Resilience
Increased investment in scientific research since the early 2000s has led to an abundance
of evidence enabling LAs to be “much better-informed, and more confident about their own
personal knowledge of climate change and their ability to access and use the ‘right’ kind of
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information” ([63], p. 1). The UK Climate Projections 2009 (UKCP09), a climate analysis tool which
helps decision-makers assess risk exposure to climate, and the UK CCRA, which addresses the urgency
of further action to climate change, are useful examples of this. However, these have not led to
“tangible adaptation actions” ([63], p. 1), with the needs of end users, particularly those at the local
level, not fully taken into consideration [33]. This section further considers the implications from
this, particularly in relation to what local responses to nexus shocks entail and how these could
be improved.
The ability of governmental structures at any level to plan in advance effective responses to
disasters, emergencies, extreme events or shocks and to support community resilience if events are
uncertain and unpredictable has been called into question [64]. Recognizing that nexus shocks are
uncertain and unpredictable by their very nature, particularly when explored in the context of complex
adaptive systems (CAS), calls for a deeper understanding of what effective governance is. This would
need to incorporate an understanding of the importance of strong collaboration, communication and
connections between actors and institutions across levels and sectors for better decision-making and
building of resilience in response to a nexus shock. With this in mind, Duit and Gallaz [65] identify
five key characteristics for effective governance structures and resilience that could assist planning:
1. Diversity—of actors and structures in the governance structure: greater diversity is likely to mean
a wider range of resources to be drawn on in emergencies;
2. Autonomy—actors and structures: autonomous components are likely to be more resilient;
3. Interdependence—of actors and structures: ability of each actor/structures to support each other;
4. Adaptability—of actors and structures to learn from experience: more adaptable actors and
structures will increase resilience;
5. Collaboration—between actors and institutions: partnership working between sectors brings in a
wide array of resources to draw on.
There is a wide range of literature on the concept of governance and multi-level processes with
recognition that “initiative and decision-making processes do not take place exclusively at the state level
but within an increasingly pluralistic structure of agents at different spatial scales,” with different levels
of cross-sector authority [13,66,67]. This aspect is raised by literature on decision-making specifically
in response to nexus shocks too. For example, Howarth [4] and Benzie [58] warn that decisions should
incorporate cross-sector and stakeholder needs and processes, and also consider the implications
of decisions for other levels (i.e., international, national, local, community), thereby adopting a
co-production process [68]. In doing so, the needs of end users would be better considered and
characteristics of the decision-making process, such as those outlined by Gallaz [65], would more
effectively interact with each other thereby contributing to better aligned processes and being more
directly useful to decision makers on the ground. This need for ‘bottom-up’ action is further recognized
as invaluable as it identifies and supports people most at risk at the local level from a nexus shock and
emphasizes co-production, collaboration and communication in designing sustainable and resilient
responses with communities.
4.2. Devolving Responsibilities for Resilience to the Local Level
The concept of the ‘Big Society’ in the UK is seen as an attempt to reduce the role of the state and
devolve responsibilities for action to the local level, bringing with it significant cuts to public sector
budgets. This has led to LAs facing a cumulative cut of revenue per person between 2009–2010 and
2015–2016 of 26.1% [56] affecting progress in adaptation and resilience by LAs in the UK ([30], p. 24).
Therefore, despite there being widespread concern about the impacts of and responses to nexus shocks,
a key contextual issue for decision-making and building resilience in response to these shocks stems
from the fact that the resources, priorities and evidence to support long-term sustainability and the
necessary collaboration and communication are not necessarily available. Calls for building resilience
to nexus shocks at the local level have been challenged as an “appropriation of the climate challenge
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by neoliberalism” [69] and research undertaken by Stevenson ([70], p. 697) concludes that regional and
policy documents that plan for nexus shocks, such as PHE’s Heatwave Plan, “. . . focus on institutional
emergency responses and infrastructure development. In these documents, communities are passive
recipients and have resilience bestowed on them by active local institutions—the top-down hierarchy
is clear.” Further, while use of the term ‘resilience’ by UK Government departments, and more widely,
has increased over the past decade, critics suggest that a resilience framing can dangerously move
focus away from addressing societal vulnerability to climate or severe weather-related shocks [71].
Consequently, an important local and community voice necessary for decision-making processes on
nexus shocks, providing an understanding of implementation on the ground, whilst not adequately
covered, could nonetheless help overcome challenges of adopting a ‘nexus approach’ [70].
Collaboration and communication between the public sector and civil society play an important
role in the effectiveness of both top-down and bottom-up decision-making in response to nexus shocks
through the provision of information, voluntary action and joint implementation of local projects ([72],
p. 857). Decisions at a national level may fail to consider implications for the local level or in the
long-term, and sectorial input in nexus shocks and grassroot participation from local communities
is needed to design sustainable and resilient responses to these shocks [4]. Social science literature
stresses that practical difficulties in using climate science to inform decision-making in response
to nexus shocks at the local level are two-way [30,33]. For example, Howarth and Painter ([33],
p. 10) recommend that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a UN-body which
assesses the large evidence base on climate change with respect to (1) the science; (2) adaptation
and vulnerability; and (3) mitigation options, ensure “a two-way communication process by which
it synthesizes evidence to inform local decision-making on climate change whilst simultaneously
drawing on more localized expertise. . . .” This is also applicable to the wider climate science evidence
base, such as the UKCP09 and the UK CCRA.
4.3. Building and Informing Local Capacity and Resilience to Nexus Shocks
The increasing focus on resilience within policy and decision-making requires greater investigation
and “necessitates a better understanding about the capacities of communities on a local level” [48]
(p. 2). Drawing on international environmental literature, Cutter et al.’s resilience categories have been
applied to research on building resilience to nexus shocks at the local level [73]. These capacities focus
on factors that can be used to measure a baseline in order to assess the impact of an intervention on
reducing the consequences of disasters, these include [74]:
• Social—demographic information (e.g., age, number of people in a household, level of education,
people with physical and learning disabilities);
• Economic—employment, home-ownership, income levels, value of property;
• Institutional—formal and informal arrangements and experience in place, emergency
response plans;
• Infrastructure—what is in place to aid responses (e.g., property-level protection (PLP),
flood defences);
• Community capital—social glue and bridging capital (e.g., knowing neighbours, participation in
community groups, local understanding of risk).
Ultimately, in order to maximise resilience to a range of nexus shocks, communities need
to be empowered to develop and possess “the capabilities and capacities. . . to thrive in response
to uncertainty, threats, disturbances and shocks. . . including the ability of individuals, and the
communities they live in, to develop the capacities needed to promote social justice in relation to any
resilient strategies” ([70], p. 695). By examining capacities, it is possible to identify commonalities that
can lead to explicit framing of transformative social change [35,70] whilst remaining aware that the
most socially and climate vulnerable communities are likely to possess less capacity to draw on in
response to a nexus shock [14,48,75]. With limited capacity and funding, and statutory requirements
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for LAs to address climate change, there is now an essential and wide-ranging role for communities
and civil society organizations in response to nexus shocks to fill the resultant gaps in knowledge and
action. Civil society organizations are particularly important intermediaries in facilitating cross-sector
and cross-level communication and collaboration between LAs, businesses and communities, but there
is a role for all actors to drive resilience-building activities.
There is a clear misalignment between the needs of decision makers at the local level and evidence
and scientific information available to help inform their decision making processes. For example,
in the UK, the late 1990s to early 2000s were characterized by the widespread challenges faced by
LAs in identifying suitable and robust evidence on climate science and impacts of climate change,
referred to as the ‘climate information usability gap’ [30]. In response to this the UK government
established national services that would help address this knowledge gap through the UKCP09,
the CCRA, and the Environment Agency’s Climate Ready Programme (see Section 3). While it could
be argued that this was an example of the ‘information deficit approach’ in practice, it nonetheless
led to increased understanding, awareness and capacity to inform decision-making processes around
climate impacts at the local level [33]. In spite of increased production and availability of science and
evidence to inform decision making at the local level, demand for this remains low due to existing
policy, legal and regulatory frameworks which are misaligned with (1) the needs of decision makers to
constructively design processes that facilitate robust solutions to climate change; and (2) the scientific
complexities of climate projections produced [76].
Whilst research and scientific evidence are relied upon to inform decision-making processes,
practitioner evidence can also play an important role in filling gaps in knowledge on adaptation
to climate change [77]. Initiatives such as the global Programme of Research on Climate Change
Vulnerability, Impacts and Adaptation (PROVIA) [78] and Country Level Impacts of Climate Change
(CLICC) help assess the impacts of climate change at the national level and work to provide relevant
information to decision makers on adaptation and vulnerability to climate change [79]. Other city-based
approaches, such as ICLEI (the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives), the C40
Cities Climate Leadership Group, weADAPT, the online platform on climate adaptation issues,
and CLIMADAPT [80] demonstrate the impact of collaborative programmes between scientists,
government and practitioners to produce effective responses to climate change. In light of local
funding cuts [81] and with the intricacies and complexities of working across the energy-food-water
nexus [82,83], these programmes are particularly useful to address the needs of those working on
the ground [84]. This aligns with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) Adaptation Committee which set up the Nairobi Work Programme and recognizes the
value of incorporating “activities that build upon each other and are linked to issues that are practical and
that engage adaptation practitioners” [85]. Incorporating practitioners and those working at a city level
for example, into climate decision-making processes could bring opportunities to address concerns
about scale, of particular relevance when considering the complex and multi-scalar impacts of nexus
shocks [68]. In doing so, processes would therefore incorporate those uniquely placed to provide
evidence regarding best practice at the local level supported by case studies and lessons learned from an
international perspective which may be of relevance when explored in different geographical contexts.
5. Conclusions
The FEWE nexus “displays a number of complexities, opportunities and challenges which are
inter-disciplinary, cross-cutting and multi-sectoral” ([9], p. 59), further recognized by the UK CCRA
2017 which differs in approach to that of the UK CCRA 2012 in several ways by including “international
risks that could have national consequences” ([25], p. 19). A nexus approach by (1) examining the
impacts of these shocks to FEWE resources; and (2) adopting an interdisciplinary and collaboration
approach, can help facilitate the sharing of knowledge, skills, expertise, best practices and lessons
learned to improve communication and collaboration in decision-making and building resilience in
response to nexus shocks at the local level.
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With the number of nexus shocks predicted to grow both in the UK and globally, characterised by
their unpredictability and with significant impacts for the local level, the need for effective local
level responses, collaboration and communication between tiers of society and governments as
well as research on this area is urgently required. This review paper provides the basis for further
research having built a solid basis collating and discussing the wide range of evidence on effective
mechanisms to inform decision making in response to nexus shocks, lessons learned and implications
for collaboration and communication. Further evidence sharing across boundaries would enable a
system of ‘knowledge exchange’ facilitating the exchange of lessons learned and successes in different
contexts (e.g., sector, industry, policy, community) and extrapolation of these findings to different
geographical, social, economic and cultural settings.
The body of evidence reviewed in this paper demonstrates that collaboration and communication
between the public sector and civil society play an important role in the effectiveness of
decision-making in response to nexus shocks through the provision of information, voluntary action
and joint implementation of local projects. In particular, co-production provides many benefits
incorporating cross-sector and stakeholder needs and processes, resulting in the needs of end users to
be better considered. This ultimately leads to a better alignment with the needs of end users with more
salient decision making processes for those implementing resilience to nexus shocks on the ground.
However, decisions made to shape responses to nexus shocks formulated at the national level may fail
to consider implications for the local level, longer term, or broader sector implications. Nonetheless,
the examination of capacities across scales can help identify commonalities leading to clearer and more
relevant framing of transformative social change. Furthermore, there is a misalignment between the
needs of decision makers at the local level and evidence and scientific information available to help
inform their decision-making processes (which are channelled through national processes) which must
subsequently be addressed.
Whilst the review of evidence presented in this review paper has focused on the UK, the insights
drawn are applicable and valid beyond this context. These may indeed be transferable and scalable to
other countries faced with similar shocks to those experienced by the UK and vice versa, facilitating
a two-way exchange alongside internal communication and collaboration processes across scales,
sectors and stakeholders. However, the inherent unavoidable challenges and barriers involved must
be acknowledged, such as the fact that impacts will be felt differently in different contexts and by
different stakeholders, the understanding of risk and knowledge needs of different communities will
vary along with their capacities to respond, and that there is a lack of trust in decision-makers and
those informing them [9]. Currently, as noted by Matyas and Pelling [86]: “Case studies on resilience
and shocks that do exist tend to be based in North America and Europe, leading to questions about the
transferability of knowledge when applied to emerging economies/polities in the developing world.
This limited geographic scope, however, is rapidly expanding as experiments with resilience continue
elsewhere in the world and ongoing policy is reframed in the language of resilience.”
This review paper has explored how responses to nexus shocks at the local level occur in the
UK and within that the roles of communication, collaboration and ultimately co-production as a
mechanism for inclusive, reflective and pro-active decision-making. There are limitations to capturing
and providing a comprehensive account of the state of play due to the breadth and depth of the scope of
the topic and the vast amount of evidence available (and continually being added to). Simultaneously
however, there is limited evidence and formal evaluation around actions at the local level, particularly
related to flood and heatwave risk management, which hinders comparative learning. The topic
therefore is not without its challenges, which leads the authors to conclude this review with questions
that would build on the findings from this paper and help to advance and guide thinking in this space.
By addressing the following questions and forging collaborations to explore these through the variety
of lenses explored in this paper, the evidence produced would better align with the needs of decision
makers on the ground:
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• The role of co-production: How can evidence of resilience to nexus shocks be co-produced in a
way that is meaningful, useful and clear for all stakeholders?
• Local community resilience: Does promoting the idea that local communities can be
climate-resilient create a false sense of security given the uncertainties around climate change,
nexus shocks and the consequences?
• Limits to local decision making: What are the limits of decision-making at the local level and how
does this affect the effectiveness of broader decision-making to build resilience to nexus shocks?
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